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Abstract—Cellular-Vehicle to Everything (C-V2X) aims at re-
solving issues pertaining to the traditional usability of Vehicle
to Infrastructure (V2I) and Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) networking.
Especially, C-V2X lowers the number of entities involved in vehic-
ular communications and allows the inclusion of cellular-security
solutions to be applied to V2X. For this, the evolvement of LTE-
V2X is revolutionary, but it fails to handle the demands of high
throughput, ultra-high reliability, and ultra-low latency alongside
its security mechanisms. To counter this, 5G-V2X is considered
as an integral solution, which not only resolves the issues related
to LTE-V2X but also provides a function-based network setup.
Several reports have been given for the security of 5G, but none of
them primarily focuses on the security of 5G-V2X. This article
provides a detailed overview of 5G-V2X with a security-based
comparison with the LTE-V2X. A novel Security Reflex Function
(SRF)-based architecture is also proposed and several research
challenges are presented to be resolved in upcoming solutions
related to the security of 5G-V2X. Alongside this, the article laid
forward the requirements of Ultra-Dense and Ultra-Secure (UD-US)
transmissions in 5G-V2X.
Index Terms—5G, Security, V2X, Mobility, Threats.
I. C-V2X: OVERVIEW
The current era of traveling is witnessing a dynamic shift
from individually driven vehicles to network controlled vehicles.
Such a facility is nowadays studied under the name of Vehicle-
to-Everything (V2X), which aims at controlling vehicular com-
munications for specific operations where a vehicle is enabled
to communicate with any of the network entity. Growing from
Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) and Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V),
V2X broadens the domain of its applicability while leveraging on
different range of technologies, such as Dedicated Short-Range
Communications (DSRC), Wireless Access in Vehicular Envi-
ronment (WAVE), Cellular-V2X (C-V2X) that includes Long-
Term Evolution V2X (LTE-V2X), 5G Infrastructure Public-
Private Partnership (5GPPP-V2X), automated-Ethernet (onboard
communications), Wireless Local Area Network V2X (WLAN-
V2X) [1] [2] [3]. C-V2X is also seen as a ground for im-
plementing technologies like Low Power Wide Area Network
(LPWAN), IPv6-Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Network
(6LoWPAN) and Long Range Wide Area Network (LoRaWAN)
where conservation of energy is the primary motive of the
deployed technology.
It has been predominantly established by earlier studies that
C-V2X is the better alternative to any of the existing technologies
based on the performance and deployment strategies. However,
factors like coverage, mobility management, Total Cost of Own-
ership (TCO), reliability, latency, security, and scalability are yet
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to be evaluated practically based on the existing infrastructure [4]
[5]. There has been a huge rush towards the establishment of
LTE-V2X models while looking at the capability of LTE in terms
of performance as well as security. Until now, existing strategies
have only kept the range of communication as a primary motive
and depends on the inclusion of additional functional layers for
security, which in contrast increases the cost of ownership as well
as decreases the compliance of autonomous as well as automated
vehicles w.r.t. practical scenarios [7] [11].
In short, C-V2X aims at bridging the gap between the vehic-
ular industry and cellular communication industry by supporting
a large range of Information and Communications Technology
(ICT) applications. All the major technologies targeting C-V2X
can be observed for the following categories:
A. Multi-Vendor Services Support (MVSS)
V2X depends on the convergence of a large number of
cellular-applications, which are being provided by multiple
vendors. In general, C-V2X is considered to be an opera-
tional property of a single organization (Original Equipment
Manufacturer (OEM)), which uses cellular facilities to control
the transmissions in the network. However, with a variety of
cellular-applications, it is liable that a single vehicle will be
supported by multiple vendors. Thus, Multi-Vendor Services
Support (MVSS) becomes one of the crucial principles to be
followed in C-V2X. Layouts through slices, edge-formations,
fog-infrastructure, Software Defined Networking (SDN), and
Network Function Virtualization (NFV) can be the principle
technologies for MVSS [6].
B. Autonomous Algorithm Safety (AAS)
Algorithms are the key behind the successful operations of
autonomous vehicles in C-V2X. Majority of these algorithms
rely on the formation of a secure channel between the vehicles
(V) and everything (X). Vulnerability in the algorithms can lead
to several types of cyber attacks on C-V2X. The threat level
increases as vehicles in the network operate from full-assistance
to no-assistance (fully-autonomous). As discussed in [1] about
the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE), the AAS will be
depending on the mode of operations and deployment scenarios
of vehicles. Specifically, in C-V2X, channel security, session
management, security-patches, key management, access con-
trol, and camouflage-detection are the key perspectives to look
forward to for AAS. Policing, resource management, and risk
mitigation are other issues to be tackled for AAS in C-V2X.
C. Network Control and Safety (NCS)
Mostly, the network control and network safety are studied
differently for easier understandings. However, from the C-
V2X point of view, it is required to study these as a single
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Fig. 1: An illustration of LTE-V2X architecture and security requirements [7].
component, as their tradeoff shows a considerable impact on the
implementation as well as the security of the network. Attaining
MVSS and AAS helps to efficiently control the operations
in C-V2X. The detection of anomalies, attack-mitigation, and
prevention against zero-day vulnerabilities are other metrics to
be handled effectively. NCS also accounts for management of
vulnerable activities, misbehavior detection and session security
in C-V2X.
II. USE-CASES FOR SECURE C-V2X
C-V2X aims at facilitating the network on-the-go, which pri-
marily matches the similar capabilities of a stand-alone cellular
network. Several studies are available that have highlighted the
practical aspects and application-based use-cases of C-V2X,
however, in order to complement the existing findings and
studies, some of the use-cases from the security perspective of
C-V2X are listed below:
• Autonomous Car Security: Autonomous cars use real-time
data and instructions from different sensors which are con-
nected to the cellular network. The guidance maps for real-
time coordination can be accessed through C-V2X commu-
nications. The security features of C-V2X helps to prevent
any impersonation and replay attack which may misguide
the vehicle and lead to interruptions as well as accidents.
The security considerations and applying several key-based
mechanisms can help to provide strong encryption for
transmissions involving guidance data to autonomous cars.
• Driver Authentications: In assisted cars, secure operations
of C-V2X can help to verify the drivers through third-party
authentications. The medical conditions of the driver can
also be verified through attached sensors and several light-
weight authentications can help to quantify access control
to the legitimate driver.
• Vehicle-Health Monitoring: The vehicle health can be mon-
itored through C-V2X, which sends the instructions to the
maintainers and car software for every issue of the machine
at the real time. The attached sensors with the vehicles
coordinate with the central authorities for self-checking
and abnormal behavior in their readings. During wrong-
configurations, there are high possibilities for an intruder to
gain access to the components of a vehicle which may be
further exploited to gain access to the entire network. Such
situations can be encountered through the formation of a
secure communication channel in C-V2X.
• Secure Public Safety Communications (PSCs): C-V2X is
expected to play a pivotal role in PSCs by supporting vehi-
cles to communicate with other devices in finding shortest
paths for providing real-time delivering of food, medicines
and another kind of services which are essential in a disaster
like a scenario. Moreover, security features of C-V2X can
help to extend its applications to military and civilians
expeditions. The systematic and secure coordination can
help to attain high reliability and low latency for the devices
involved in C-V2X setup.
• Inter and Intra Vehicular Security: The trust and privacy
are major concerns in the case of inter- and intra-vehicular
communication [8]. Inter-vehicular communications refer
to C-V2X setup that comprises vehicles from different
vendors. In such a scenario, security becomes a dominant
factor, and it is expected to use pseudonyms or proxies
for preventing inter-network eavesdropping. Intra-vehicular
communication refers to the onboard operations of a vehicle
involved in C-V2X. In such a mode, security technologies
are required to protect the customer’s private information
and the vehicle systems from “hacker”. The attacks in
any of these modes pose a considerable effect on the
trustworthiness of the network as well as it shows a huge
3impact from an ownership point of view and quality of
experience.
• Secure Mobility management and Service Layoffs: Mobility
and service layoffs are the crucial aspects of C-V2X. There
are several solutions available which focus on the fast
as well as secure service layoffs and handover manage-
ment [15]. However, with proprietary network formations,
the security factors become dominant and should be re-
solved through mechanisms applicable to C-V2X, especially
leveraging on LTE and 5G technologies.
• S-B2MP (Secure Base to Multi-Peer Networks): One of
the interactively keen examples of C-V2X is B2MP, in
which a vehicle serves as the Base Station to multiple peers.
However, the presence of an attacker on-board may expose
the key metrics of the network, which can be used to launch
several exploits in the network leading to a huge impact on
the overall formation of C-V2X. Thus, S-B2MP is another
security-oriented use case of these networks.
• Secured Named Data Networking (NDN): NDN is the basic
network communication mode which supports secure data
directly at the network layer by making every data packet
verifiable. NDN uses ad hoc and broadcast-style communi-
cations and is independent of communication technologies;
therefore it can be used with C-V2X to enhance its feature
based on secure media-independent formations.
• Traffic Management and Anomaly Detections: The traf-
fic management includes issues related to speed manage-
ment, traffic information, routing information, cooperative
navigation, etc [9]. Moreover, driver-behavior, vehicular-
anomalies, and network intruders are other factors affecting
the core functionalities of the vehicular system. Sufficiently
secure mechanisms can help to resolve these issues and
identify potential anomalies prior to their attack.
III. C-V2X SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND TRENDS
The traditional technologies for V2X, evolving V2I, and V2V,
like DSRC and 802.11p, require a large number of entities for
connecting vehicles and supporting their transmissions to OEMs.
However, with the evolution of C-V2X under 3GPP, the existing
cellular infrastructure can be used for supporting the vehicular
communications. With the advent of LTE technology, the V2X
was highlighted for its vast range of applications, and with a
shift of LTE towards 5G, the upcoming trends are focusing to
utilize both these architectures to provide security services to
the involved entities [10] [7] [11]. This section discusses base
architectures defined for LTE-V2X and 5G-V2X along with their
security concerns and applicability.
A. LTE-V2X
LTE-V2X leverages services from eNB, and Mobility Man-
agement Entity (MME), which accounts for providing various
control functions for V2X, as shown in Fig. 1. The standard
LTE architecture comprises Packet Data Network Gateway (P-
GW), User Equipment (UE), Serving Gateway (S-GW), Home
Subscriber Server (HSS), Broadcasting Server (BS), all of which
operate as components of Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio
Access Network (E-UTRAN) [12]. The traffic to the Data
Network (DN) is facilitated through P-GW and measurement
report based transmissions are used for supporting vehicular
communications. Although efficient, there are a series of issues
with this architecture as it is unable to provide strong mecha-
nisms for vehicle authentication, credential management, privacy
and anonymity of involved entities [13] [8]. Moreover, LTE-V2X
does not comply with the upcoming requirements of ultra-low
latency and ultra-high reliability [7]. In addition, there is limited
support for positioning and trajectory based solutions for V2X.
As depicted in Fig. 1, the security requirements are tedious to
resolve based on the component architecture of LTE. Thus, a
paradigm shift is required from LTE to 5G for supporting edge
computing, which is an integral aspect of V2X services.
B. 5G-V2X
In contrast to LTE, 5G-V2X is a function based architecture
which primarily focuses on providing service-based accessibil-
ity to the involved entities. The key advantages of 5G-V2X
are service-based policing for applications, low-latency, high-
reliability and functional support for V2X. V2X can be operated
in Non-Standalone 5G (NS-5G) or Standalone-5G (S-5G) mode
depending on the deployment changes to the initial architec-
ture [11] [14]. NS-5G-V2X is dependent on the underlying
LTE-deployment to facilitate the requirements laid by the 5G
communications. The scope of enhancement to security is limited
as this required exact identification of the 5G functions, which
will match the components defined in LTE [7]. However, with
S-5G, the scope widens, but it also requires work from ground
level while managing communication back to the core.
The core functions of 5G-V2X setup include, Policy Control
Function (PCF), Access and Mobility Function (AMF), Authen-
tication Server Function (AUSF), Session Management Function
(SMF), Application Function (AF), Unified Data Management
(UDM), and User Plane Function (UPF), as shown in Fig. 2.
The security features are provided through specified security
functions, namely, Authentication Credential Repository and
Processing Function (ARPF), Security Anchor Function (SEAF)
both of which are collocated with the AUSF [14]. The details on
each of them can be followed from the technical specification
by 3GPP on the security of 5G networks [11]. However, there
are no concurrent studies which discuss the security from V2X
perspectives. This article provides an initial screening of such
requirements as discussed in the next section.
IV. 5G-V2X: SECURITY ATTACKS, THREATS, AND
REQUIREMENTS
Majority of the shortcomings of DSRC, 802.11p, and LTE-
V2X are supposed to be handled through the efficient function
handlers in 5G-V2X. The reach of security solutions and possible
remedies against known and unknown threats depend on the
deployment strategies of 5G-V2X. If V2X is enabled with NS-
5G, the attacks possible on LTE-V2X holds true and can exploit
the services in 5G-V2X; however, with S-5G, the attack window
decreases and the protection against threats can be increased
while maintaining ultra-low latency and ultra-high reliability
amongst the entities. Network planning and deployment play the
key role in deciding the security of 5G-V2X. The placement of
functions and control, and decision on policing implicate any
possible exploitation of vulnerabilities. In addition, the exposure
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of keys and the use of an insecure channel of communication
are other reasons for attacks in 5G-V2X. Moreover, V2X forms
the edge component of 5G, which may or may not have the
secure channel. Thus, the possibilities of attacks increase when
the devices undergo major mobility transitions. The cell coverage
is the other issue which can be evaluated by the eavesdropper to
launch any potential attacks on the vehicles.
A. General Issues
This section provides a point by point detail of several key
attacks and threats with reasoning which are to be cautiously
removed while deploying services through 5G-V2X.
• The main reasons for a possible attack in 5G-V2X is the ir-
regular placement of gNB, which is the counterpart of eNB
and MME of LTE-V2X. The primary impact can be caused
by the authentication of vehicles and their authorization. In
the semi-autonomous mode, the certificate-based security,
provided through email or semi-autonomous mode, is used
assuming the network to be operable on a secure-line up
between RSU and OEM. However, with major autonomy,
the certificate-based solution may hinder the smooth transit
between gNBs.
• The presence of malicious node may exploit the vulner-
ability in OBU and gain access to the network (zero-day
attacks). Thus, it becomes the responsibility of the network
entity to prevent such attacks. Static information and weak
hash functions may lead to certificate forgery. Preventing the
capturing of the secure element of a vehicle is an ultimate
requirement.
• Especially for cellular-assisted autonomous driving, it is
desirable to prevent any known and chosen plain/ciphertext
attacks. Such attacks are possible as major sensor informa-
tion is shared without encryption. Backward broadcasting
and signal storming are the other issues related to the
security aspect of 5G-V2X.
• Message security is another factor for securing transmis-
sions in 5G-V2X. The content in these networks should
be secured through secret keys. With the existing security
modules, the keys are generated by following a hierarchical
pattern. It is desired to make sure that the freshness of keys
is maintained and synchronized patterns must be used to
prevent any replay attack or De-synchronous attacks.
• Irrespective of the network planning and layouts, side
channel attacks are tedious to detect and these can exploit
the entire network by merely affecting the vehicle or gNB
in the 5G setup. In addition to these, service-based attacks
are expected to prevail in 5G-V2X unlike DSRC or LTE-
V2X as all the content in the 5G is expected to be classified
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Fig. 3: A detailed list of attacks and threats with a focus on the involved and affected entities/functions of C-V2X. (Entity List: -
V: Vehicles (on-board units (OBUs))/ User Equipment, R: Road Side Units, AS: Application Server, SF: Security Functions)
into several services. Thus, service-based attack prevention
and threat detection are key issues to focus while securing
the functionalities in 5G-V2X.
It is worth noting that the security in 5G-V2X not only depends
on the security functions but also on the location of certain
regular entities/functions, which involve gNB, SMF, AMF, and
UPF. Control over any of these exploits the entire network. Thus,
it becomes inevitably important to secure the passes between
these entities while leveraging the services of security functions.
However, the positioning of servers providing security functions
must be carefully selected. A security anchor function near to
user may lead to several client-side attacks while placing at
the core increases the latency and weakens the links between
the AMF, SMF, and UPF. For clear understanding, the impact
of several attacks and threats with a difference in the use of
technology is presented in Fig. 3.
B. 5G-V2X Specific Security Issues
There is a scarcity of studies and no-concurrent solution
available which predominantly depicts the security aspects of
5G-V2X. The ones for NS-5G-V2X only focuses on the existing
issues limited to the infrastructure support of LTE. In the recent
releases of TS series by 3GPPP [11]1, security is defined for
5G-V2X in the Access Stratum and Non-Access Stratum mode.
The primary security is defined using 5G-AKA or EAP-AKA’
through a hierarchical key distribution. The security is governed
through secure key exchanges and by assuming different strate-
gies for each of the involved entity. Although this report provides
a detailed possible layout of security for 5G, it is yet to be
considered for V2X because of difference in the dynamics and
mode of operations of a vehicle from a regular UE.
13GPP TS 33.501 V0.7.1 (2018-01)
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The entire process involves one time overhead of obtaining partial keys.
Updates in KSRF-SW-P are required only when user/vehicle side changes are made to the applications. No changes are required
in the KSRF-SW as mobility management is kept independent of authentication.
The mobility management can be carried out without re-authentication, based on the decisions passed by SRFs.
Fig. 4: An illustration of the conceptualized 5G-V2X security architecture for intra- and inter-mode of operations for vehicles using
Security Reflex Function (SRF).
V2X authentication and securing the credentials are the key
issues to be considered for 5G-V2X [7]. Moreover, network
layout and planning are yet to be fixed and how the handover will
be done in intra- and inter-modes needs further investigations.
The deployment of 5G-functions near to edge or core also
needs investigations from 5G’s perspectives. Although, C-V2X
(LTE and 5G) decreases the number of RSU required in the
existing technology focused by vendors (from OEM to Vehicle
connectivity), yet there are issues pertaining to universal avail-
ability, interim-management of slices, and access management.
The requirement of dynamic RSUs, as stated in [7], can be
attained through stationed vehicles, but there is no architecture
to grasp this facility.
In addition to the above discussions, the 5G security reports
depend on the expensive backward operations which become
complex when applied to V2X solutions. Moreover, use of
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) for initial authentication can
only be accounted for a dense RSU network, and it involves a
high dependency on a centralized authority, which is a problem
when looking at a global deployment of unified V2X technology.
The available information in TS reports [11] resolves the perfect
forward security for 5G UEs, but there is a gap in the use of this
technology for V2X. Although, 5G architecture aims to protect
keys to be used in the next phase, capturing of the vehicle or
signature replication can lead to the violation of forwarding
secrecy. Thus, attaining perfect forward secrecy is a crucial
aspect for V2X because of the physical threats to the credentials
of vehicles.
Another issue to be taken care of is the extensive dependence
on the primary authentication and assumption on security assur-
ance schemes. With the involvement of long-term secret keys,
it is yet to be decided whether these will be generated through
the 5G-core or the 5G functional units will be deployed in the
periphery of OEMs. The protection of long-term keys depends on
the deployment range and positioning of 5G-security functions
for V2X. SEAF must be placed in the deep network leading
to nearly impossible physical attacks, but this also raises the
concerns as SMF and AMF, in this case, have to be placed near
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Fig. 5: A graphical comparison for signaling overheads of
vehicle’s mobility through EAP-AKA’ in the traditional and the
proposed SRF-based 5G-V2X.
gNB or vehicle for facilitated transitions [11]. Alongside, the
current versions do not provide any discussion on home network
security of V2X and there are limited discussions on using public
key operations when the vehicle is operating in its home network.
Further, attaining end to end protection by preventing Sybil
attacks leading to effects on confidentiality and integrity is a must
while deploying 5G-V2X solutions. Finally, the confirmations
of requesting entities and identification of vehicles need to be
decided again from performance as well as security perspectives.
V. 5G-V2X: CONCEPTUALIZED ARCHITECTURE
The technology solutions for C-V2X at the moment support
more of V2V and V2I than V2X. The existing conceptualized
views leverage 5G security modules for securing V2X communi-
cations. However, as discussed in the earlier section, the security
for the majority of the components is done through computa-
tionally expensive operations and any sort of attack can cause
severe damage. To resolve such issue and to further enhance the
performance, a conceptualized architecture is proposed on the
backbone of the architecture given by 3GPP [11].
A. Architectural Enhancements
The proposed architecture discusses the security inclusions
through edge computing where users, vehicles and several sen-
sors/devices are treated as a part of everything and strategies are
provided for both intra- as well as inter-handover of vehicles.
The proposed conceptualized architecture uses a new function
“Security Reflex Function (SRF)”, as shown in Fig. 4, to support
rapid changes in the network as well as to define policies
for access management. Moreover, SRF accounts for attaining
the feature of Ultra-Dense and Ultra-Secure (UD-US) mobility
management, which is needed as it is expected that a huge
number of cellular-supported vehicles will be roaming on roads
demanding all time connectivity. It is desired to understand the
features and operational strategy of SRF before following its role
in 5G-V2X. The details are:
• Edge-based authenticator: SRF provides edge-initiated au-
thentication for the entities involved in 5G-V2X. It reduces
the burden of the core by covering user-side roles of SMF
and AMF.
• Partial-key allocations: SRF uses partial key allocations by
deriving several keys from the keys obtained from AMF
and SEAF. It uses device-based specific keys for managing
V2X connectivity. It sits on top of gNB and can operate in
a dual mode with the specified gNB.
• Supports on-demand gNB: SRF allows the strategic control
over the network by including static vehicles as user-side
gNBs, termed as gNB’. This also helps to support parking-
based networks as well as Emergency Communication
Vehicles (ECV).
• Allows splitting and slice management: SRF supports the
core principle of slice management and helps to maintain
the vehicle as well as slice anonymity by deriving several
short-term keys depending on the mode of operations (intra
or inter).
• User-side secondary authentication: SRF allows user-side
authentication when the static vehicles are used as access
points. Moreover, it allows secondary authentication for
specifying route optimization by reducing the number of
intermediate hops while maintaining the end to end security.
• Multi-radio facilities: With vehicles in proximity to ev-
erything, it is desired that multiple radio facilities must
be supported by the 5G security functions. However, it
is an expensive operation to include such facilities on all
devices. Thus, SRF act as a common function, which allows
radio-translations to support the security of vehicles having
communication in different modes.
B. Workflow and Key Generations
The workflow and key generations in the conceptualized
architecture can be orchestrated through specific frameworks or
by simply dividing the existing keys. In the derived setup, partial
keys are used, which can be treated similarly to the secondary
authentication where SEAF is used to derive several SEAF’.
However, SEAF’ does not accounts for rapid changes, nor does
it provides any support for edge-based V2X security. Additional
overheads are also accounted because of re-verifications between
the SEAF and SEAF’. In the proposed architecture, two different
setups can be used to deploy SRFs.
In the first setup, the SRF can be fixed using switch (SW)-
hub (gNB) architecture. The SRF then becomes the interface
between the gNB and the core security functions and KAMF or
KSEAF is used to derive several KSRF−SW and KSRF−SW−P
keys, which further generate theKgNB and KV for the terminals
and vehicles in its periphery. The derived keys are particularly
applicable either for mobility management or authentication, as
shown in Fig. 4. This is the simplest form and it allows easier
intra-handovers without additional overheads on gNB. However,
it involves additional switches to be placed as a control center
for several hubs or gNBs.
In the second setup, SRF and gNB are collocated, which adds
to the overheads of operations on a single terminal. However,
several security-passes and inclusion of additional switches as
well as modifications to the core architecture can be avoided in
this case. As an abstracted view, SRF may look like a derivative
of existing architecture, but it provides specialized location and
trajectory-based key generations, which adds up to the efficiency
and service-based security requirements of 5G-V2X. Based on
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the location as well as the availability of Static Vehicles (SV),
SRF keys are used to derive additional keys, KSRF−SW (SV )
and KSRF−SW (V )(Fig. 4), which enable 5G-V2X architecture
to use SV as one of the gNBs. This widens the coverage and
can be considered as one of the core solutions for PSCs through
5G-V2X2.
C. 5G-V2X Authentication
This conceptualized architecture can be used to support the
host as well as network initiated authentications. For V2X
security, the proposed architecture uses KX and KV for edge-
initiated authentication. Both these keys are derived at the edge
and it prevents any long-distance transmissions, which also helps
to attain optimized routes for the derivation of keys as well as
V2X authentication. The location and trajectory initiated key
generation also reduce the signaling overheads as KSRF alone
can be used to generate the edge-side keys.
The SRF-based architecture is secure for most of the issues
that are presented in Fig. 3. For the authentication and authoriza-
tion, SRF derives its keys from AMF, which follows session-wise
key generation, thus, maintaining the freshness throughout the
connectivity. Even if the network synchronization is disturbed
for the vehicles, the SRF maintains an independent connection
to the core security functions, allowing zero-drop during re-
verification. Most dominantly, SRF helps to overcome issues
related to certificate forgery and also allows expensive public
key operations to be used by providing a short-pass between the
vehicles and everything. The vehicles can use dual authentication
through SRF, which allows partial authentication with the gNB or
nearby sensor and partial authentication with the core functions,
once the vehicle-services are initialized.
In the intra-mode, when the vehicles operate in the periphery
of gNB, SV, or a sensor, no additional mechanisms or key
exchanges are required for re-authentication as KV is securely
derived from KSRF . The rapid changes to the network are
also handled by the re-authentication with the SRF, which also
prevents issues related to access management. For the inter-mode
operations (handover), AMF accounts for the security of SRFs
2The proposed scheme divides the mobility and authentication procedures
allowing the network to respond quickly to the rapid changes.
and prevents re-authentication by relying on SRF to check the
validity of vehicle under movement.
All these operations help to decrease the total cost of op-
erations, which is measured on basis of the number of hops
to be traversed for generating keys, especially during the re-
authentication. Moreover, the end to end security as well as
the backward security can easily be observed by including the
SRF in the existing architecture. SRF also exhibits the control
properties which can be extended through a different framework
for attaining UD-US mobility management. Furthermore, SRF,
through the disintegration of authentication and mobility man-
agement, allows extensive privacy and anonymous operations
along with highly secure network management. The disintegrated
operations also reduce the network stress in terms of overheads
by dividing the user-side management functionaries.
To present this, standard EAP-AKA’ is used for authentica-
tion when a vehicle moves across the terminals in the tradi-
tional [11] and the proposed setup. The proposed architecture
brings authentication near to vehicle at the edge leading to a
conservation of 2.5% to 11.3% signaling overheads, as shown in
Fig. 5, by utilizing the computational model given in [15]. The
signaling overheads are reduced based on the intermediate hops
involved in authentication. The output for EAP-AKA’ shows
lesser improvement as the protocol is driven by core security
functions. However, to fully utilize the proposed architecture, it
is recommended to consider developing novel protocols that can
enhance the performance to a large extent at a similar strength
of security.
VI. DISCUSSIONS AND RESEARCH CHALLENGES
Security concerns of C-V2X are dominated by the type of
architecture used for deploying devices and entities up to the
core. Especially for 5G-V2X, there are some additional security
concerns, such as service-based accessibility, signal storming,
and edge-based authentications. These issues did not prevail
much in LTE-V2X; however, for NS-5G-V2X, these become
dominant performance affecting concerns for LTE equipment.
Further details can be followed from Fig. 6.
Some of the key research challenges and open issues, which
can be targeted as a part of future works, while using the
conceptualized architecture, are presented below:
9• Prevention of excessive service initiations: It is one of
the key concerns- when an attacker is able to violate the
SRF, it may initiate multiple services to interrupt the V2X
operations.
• SRF positioning: The positioning of SRF function is an
optimization issue and it may vary from a scenario to
scenario. In some cases, where OEM wants a direct control
of the vehicles, SRF functions need to be placed near the
OEM, which will violate the principles of edge-computing.
Thus, its positioning and selection of key-relaying solutions
are major concerns to be resolved.
• Accurate sensor relaying: The location and trajectory based
key generations are based on accurate sensor readings.
Thus, it is desired that vehicles’ data is accurately retrieved
under all circumstances.
• Credential theft: In case of false requests from the vehicles,
the exposure of KV may pose threats to KX , which is
the key of the devices with which the vehicles communi-
cate directly. Thus, this will involve re-authentication, but
identification of an instance of re-authentication is tedious,
and it is desired to develop strategies for credential theft.
Solutions like self-evaluations and introduction of self-
checking logic can help to facilitate these requirements
whenever the vehicles are initiated in the network.
• Configuration attacks: These attacks are most dominant for
NS-5G-V2X, as V2V/P broadcasts can be used to mislead
the receiving entity to make wrong decisions. These attacks
also pave a way for routing attacks as well as session
hijacking.
• Perfect forward secrecy: This issue is applicable to the
majority of the networks as no concurrent approach can
provide perfect forward secrecy at an efficient rate. How-
ever, with the use of certain technologies and protocols,
it can be achieved on the backbone of the conceptualized
architecture by utilizing several instances of SRF.
• Insider threats and zero-day attacks: Privacy and anonymity
are affected most by insider threats and potential zero-
day vulnerabilities. Both these tend to expose the entire
network and share the key-exchange phenomenon to outer
entities, which can launch attacks to misled the vehicles [8].
Thus, managing insider threats and developing strategies to
prevent zero-day attacks, by understanding the window of
vulnerability especially for V2X, are major challenges to
resolve in 5G-V2X.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article presents an overview of C-V2X technologies and
standards while focusing on the current situations of LTE-V2X
and 5G-V2X. Several use-cases, service supports, and security
requirements are discussed in detail. Issues related to existing
5G-V2X based on standalone as well as non-standalone are pre-
sented through comparisons. A conceptualized Security Reflex
Function (SRF)-based architecture is also presented, which aims
to reduce the burden of secure mobility management of vehi-
cles in 5G-V2X. In addition, various open issues and research
directions are discussed which help to understand the current
aspects of 5G-V2X and its security alongside the usability of
the conceptualized architecture.
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